<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" standalone="yes"?><rss version="2.0" xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"><channel><title>Vendor-Management on David R. Longnecker - Converting Coffee to Code</title><link>https://drlongnecker.com/tags/vendor-management/</link><description>Recent content in Vendor-Management on David R. Longnecker - Converting Coffee to Code</description><generator>Hugo</generator><language>en-US</language><lastBuildDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:00:00 -0600</lastBuildDate><atom:link href="https://drlongnecker.com/tags/vendor-management/index.xml" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml"/><item><title>The 8.8 Million Citizen Password</title><link>https://drlongnecker.com/blog/2026/10/the-8-8-million-citizen-password/</link><pubDate>Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:00:00 -0600</pubDate><guid>https://drlongnecker.com/blog/2026/10/the-8-8-million-citizen-password/</guid><description>&lt;p&gt;If you manage technology in an enterprise environment, you&amp;rsquo;ve participated in the annual security review. Procurement sends out a two-hundred-question assessment. The vendor returns an audited PDF affirming compliance, everyone breathes a sigh of relief, and the binder gets filed away for another twelve months.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Then reality strikes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On October 10, Danish news outlets broke the details of a massive breach of Denmark&amp;rsquo;s central Civil Registration System (CPR). An anonymous hacker claimed responsibility for pulling personal identification numbers for nearly 8.8 million Danish residents. The breach didn&amp;rsquo;t require a zero-day exploit or state-sponsored espionage. According to reporting from &lt;a href="https://cphpost.dk/2026-10-10/news/round-up/123456-password-used-in-massive-danish-cpr-data-breach/"&gt;The Copenhagen Post&lt;/a&gt;, the attacker gained access through a small external billing contractor called Pays ApS, an IT provider with two registered employees (which makes you wonder who sat on their &amp;ldquo;security committee&amp;rdquo;).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At least three accounts at the company held credentials with direct query access to the national registry. &lt;strong&gt;The administrator password was &lt;code&gt;123456&lt;/code&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/p&gt;</description></item></channel></rss>